On March 18, 2010, the SASAC announced that, apart from 16 central enterprises with real estate as their main business, 78 central enterprises without real estate as their main business must exit the real estate business after completing phased work such as developing their own land and implementing existing projects. One year later, the list allowed to engage in real estate business increased from 16 to 21. The expansion of the list also concealed the game between the SASAC and central SOEs, and destined the difficulty of future implementation.

In the first two years, the "exit from real estate order" still received positive responses from central SOEs, and many central SOEs exited the real estate business. However, after 2012, there were few large-scale withdrawal actions by central SOEs, with only sporadic equity transfers or negotiated transfer projects appearing. The efficiency of the "exit from real estate order" slowly declined, and it could even be said to have stalled. Not only that, some enterprises that originally had no real estate business also entered the real estate industry. Data from land consolidation and reserve departments in Beijing, Shanghai and other places show that many central SOEs named in the "exit from real estate order" are still expanding against the trend and acquiring land.

Especially since the launch of a new round of booming property market in June 2016, the enthusiasm of central SOEs to "get a share" has only increased, creating one "land king" concept after another, and they have even been questioned and accused by outsiders as a driver of soaring housing prices.

Why has the "exit from real estate order" been poorly implemented? The author believes there are mainly two reasons: from a policy perspective, the "exit from real estate order" is not a binding document and lacks sufficient operability. It neither provides a clear timetable and specific operational methods for central SOEs to exit real estate development, nor does it have supporting follow-up accountability mechanisms. This leaves central SOEs huge room to exploit loopholes, and also causes them to lose the motivation to exit real estate development, relying entirely on their own self-discipline; from the perspective of market economy entities, it is reasonable for central SOEs to pursue profits. Central SOEs are also market economy entities and are subject to performance assessments, so it is understandable that they are attracted by profits.

Therefore, to effectively promote the implementation of the "exit from real estate order," the author suggests: on the one hand, refine the "exit from real estate order" to make it operable. It is possible to specify a timetable for central SOEs to implement the "exit from real estate order," improve relevant accountability mechanisms, and incorporate the implementation of the "exit from real estate order" into the assessment mechanism for central SOE leaders, thereby forcing central SOEs to implement the "exit from real estate order" in practice; on the other hand, take advantage of the opportunity of deepening SOE reform to accelerate the exit of central SOEs from real estate business. SOE reform has a relatively complete procedure. Through reform, non-core and commercial real estate businesses can be cleaned up, and the "exit from real estate order" can be implemented in place through reform.