On July 2, a document titled 'Request for Instructions on Adjusting the Commercial Housing Purchase Restriction Policy of Our City' appeared online. The document, signed by the Jinan Urban and Rural Construction Committee, was submitted to the 'Municipal Government', and its main content was a proposal to lift purchase restrictions on both new commercial housing and existing housing citywide, given the downward trend in both sales volume and prices of commercial housing.

Another local version of the purchase-restriction adjustment game that everyone is secretive about. Not long ago, Hohhot in Inner Mongolia had just experienced an incident in which a document canceling purchase restrictions was attributed to a 'printing error'. Compared with Hohhot's approach, Jinan's response was even more vague: it is under study and will be implemented after confirmation. Such official wording is no different from Hohhot's 'printing error' and the earlier denials of loosening purchase restrictions in various cities and regions. In short, the game of loosening purchase restrictions everywhere has ultimately become a 'silent ending'.

Why has it come to this? It is all because of the property market. Since the beginning of this year, the central government has strictly controlled capital flows into the property market and also curbed local governments' impulse to sell land. The package of reforms also started with the financial system, and commercial banks have felt the pressure of reform. Rampant local financing platforms and interbank business have been curbed, the risks of shadow banking and local debt have been exposed to public opinion, and the decision-making level has sternly warned those with primary responsibility. Limited funds have been directed through 'mini-stimulus' to the real economy, such as agriculture, rural areas and farmers, and small and micro enterprises, which urgently need financing.

The property market is sluggish, obviously. In the current property market, except for first-tier cities, cities below the second tier are facing serious inventory backlogs. Hohhot has 120,000 units of commercial housing for sale in stock, with a monthly absorption volume of no more than 1,000 units. By this calculation, it will take at least 10 years to digest the existing inventory. The city's dependence on land finance is as high as 78.8%, ranking 16th among more than 40 cities with purchase restrictions nationwide in terms of land finance dependence.

Hohhot is like this, Jinan is also like this, and other second- and third-tier cities are no better.

Under the tight curse of purchase restrictions, local governments are under enormous fiscal pressure and can be said to be trapped in a dilemma where the property market makes them and also destroys them. Hoping to loosen purchase restrictions, revitalize the stagnant market, digest existing inventory, and smooth out new supply has become the motivation and driving force for various places to stir into action and loosen purchase restriction policies. It is worth mentioning that during the four years of purchase restrictions, especially in the past two years, many cities have tested the waters of loosening the property market. This anxiety spreading across cities and regions has accumulated repeatedly, but no matter how they float trial balloons or issue alternative documents, they cannot overcome the general policy trend.

Local purchase restriction policies are concrete practices for implementing the central government's macro-control policies. The more than 40 cities implementing purchase restrictions share commonalities but also have local characteristics. Since last year, along with the economic downturn and the successive introduction of a package of reform measures for structural adjustment, various places have faced bottleneck pressure in development and transformation. Energizing the real economy and digesting excess capacity have become the main tone of the central government's macroeconomic policy. This also reminds various places that land finance and the property market economy are unsustainable and that transformation is necessary.

The central government has not introduced any new macro-control policies for the property market, but it has also placed the tight curse of unchanged previous macro-control policies on various places. Therefore, the purchase restriction policy implemented for four years has not seen a top-down window adjustment. From banks to local governments, making them understand and become accustomed to bearing the consequences of their own actions is one of the two highlights of the central government's comprehensive deepening of reform. Banks' adaptation to the market and self-discipline are commendable, while various places differ in their ability to withstand pressure and kick their dependence on the property market.

For cities overly dependent on land finance, the pressure of squeezing out property market inventory may be unbearable. Perhaps Hohhot and Jinan are typical representatives of such cities. But local anxiety and attempts, even if official red-header documents are issued, can only find a way out for themselves in the face of the central government's tone and dare not easily loosen restrictions.

Due to the particularity and local characteristics of local purchase restrictions, appropriate fine-tuning is harmless as long as it does not violate central policies. For example, cities such as Tianjin, Nanning and Changsha have stimulated their local property markets through regional adjustments or by broadening the scope of purchase restrictions.

However, lifting purchase restrictions cannot solve the fundamental problem. It can only achieve something in digesting existing inventory and cannot solve the structural difficulties essential to the property market. Moreover, without banks' cooperation in loosening loan restrictions, purchase restrictions are of little significance. In the market context of a wait-and-see property market, only rigid demand can be revitalized, but what rigid-demand buyers need most is bank credit support. The central bank's window guidance to protect rigid demand only led commercial banks to speed up loan approval, with no change in interest rates.

Therefore, various places should no longer have the impulse to loosen purchase restrictions; this logic does not work. The result of the purchase restriction game can only be a silent ending that lets public opinion revel.